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I investigate the eect of income on mortality of the pensioners, com-
paring three subsequent policy periods in Austria. The pensioners who
retired in the second period received 25% lower pension than those in the
rst period. This reduction in income was removed in the third policy
period. These two reforms allow a causal identication of the eect of in-
come on health. I estimate that lower pension did not change the mortality
rate. The results are conrmed using both experiments and dierent meth-
ods of estimation. Furthermore, with regard to the expenditure on health
services, I get that only prescribed drug consumption increased, with the
remaining analyzed factors being unaected.
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Health and income are positively correlated (see, e.g., Bloom and Canning, 2000;
Rogot et al., 1992). Income might aect health and health might inuence income
in many dierent ways. Wealthier individuals can aord more and better health
care, are able to spend more money on health prevention, can also aord to pay
more on living in better and healthier environments, and may be more sensitive
to unhealthy working conditions. \The dierential use of health knowledge and
technology" (Cutler et al., 2006, p. 115) may also explain important parts of
the relation between social status (including income) and health. There are also
paths through which income may have a negative eect on health. Usually, the
eect of earning more comes with increased working hours, increased accidental
risks, and/or increased stress at work. This inuence of income on health can be
described using a health production framework (Grossman, 1972).
On the other hand, health may inuence labor supply, eort, and thus, income.
Smith (1998, 1999) and Wu (2003) analyze the causal eect of health on income
using unanticipated health shocks.
Scholars prefer randomized experiments to analyze the causal eect of income
on health. However, in most cases, the experiments are economically and/or
ethically not feasible1. In the cases where the eect of income on health is of
primary interest, it may seem paradoxical to pay the participants of a study to
accept less income, and it may seem oensive to take away money from randomly
drawn citizens. We rely on the exploitation of natural experiments based on the
evaluation of the policies aecting income to analyze the causal eect of income
on health.
1Thomas et al. (2006) is one of the recent exceptions.
1The empirical literature shows a positive but not always signicant causal eect
of income on health. Benzeval et al. (2000), Case (2001), and Frijters et al. (2005)
nd a small causal eect of income on self-reported health. Cawley et al. (2010)
analyze the eect of reduced social security payments on the retirees' weight and
BMI in the US and do not nd any evidence for the causal eects of income on
the weight or BMI of elderly Americans. Adams et al. (2003) analyze the causal
eect of income for elderly persons in the US. They do not nd any\associations
of health conditions and changes in total wealth" (p. 51) for persons aged 70
and above. Lindahl (2005) does not nd any signicant eect of lottery prizes on
mortality in Sweden.
In their meta study, Cutler et al. (2006) conclude with regard to the determinants
of mortality within countries that it \seems clear that much of the link between
income and health is a result of the latter causing the former, rather than the
reverse." (p. 115) This suggests that all those ndings of quantitatively small
and mostly insignicant eects are in line with their interpretation.
Switching to Austria, in May 2000, the European Court of Justice ruled that
one type of early retirement violated the European law. This decision surprised
the government and the public and the subsequent abolition of this retirement
in June 2000 can be seen as a natural experiment. Before the abolition, retirees
received up to 25 % more gross pension than thereafter. Four months after the
regime change, the replacement rate was raised to its previous high level again.
Using the data from Austrian social security records, I exploit these two changes
to study the causal eect of income on health for elderly persons.
To measure health, I use the mortality rates over a period of seven years, which
is the ultimate indicator of bad health for these elderly persons. Second, for a
2small proportion of the individuals, the data from the public health insurance is
available. Therefore, I can use the health expenditure on drugs or medical aid,
visits to general or special practitioners, and hospital visits.
The Austrian social security records contain detailed information not only on
the employment histories but also on the health histories of all Austrian private
sector employees. I compare the cohorts aged 57 to 59 in the period January to
September 2000 for the rst regime change and cohorts aged 57 to 60 in the period
June to December 2000 for the second regime change. All cohorts compared are
exposed to the same health\risks" (epidemics, etc.) all the time.
The seven year mortality values for these persons are not statistically dierent.
I see that only the expenditure on drugs increases signicantly, but all other
expenses and measures (visits to a doctor or a hospital, expenditure on medical
aids, etc.) are unaected.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Austrian Pension System
Between the 1970s and the 1990s, Austria had a generous pension system that
contained various provisions for early retirement (see Hofer and Koman, 2006). In
2000, Austria spent 14.3 % of its GDP on pension expenditure (Eurostat Statistics
Database, Economic Policy Committee, 2010). Although the regular retirement
age is similar to that in other European countries (65 for men and 60 for women),
the actual retirement age of men decreased steadily from nearly 62 in the 1970s
to about 58 in 1995. Since then, it has increased slightly to 58.5 in 2000 and has
stayed around 59 since 2005 (Hauptverband der  osterr. Sozialversicherungstr ager,
32010). The large share of pension expenditure in the GDP and the low retirement
age is accompanied by one of the lowest participation rates of elderly men and
women amongst the OECD countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2006).
Up to the year 2000, several early retirement schemes enabled men aged 60 and
women aged 55 to retire early, e.g., for those who have been insured for long or
are unemployed. Early retirement due to reduced working capacity was possible
for men aged 57 and above. For males, the only other alternative to retire at
the age of 59 or earlier was the invalidity pension (IP). For both alternatives, a
doctor has to check whether or not the applicant had reduced working capacity.2
The calculation of pension benets is based on the number of years insured (the
contribution years) as a basis for the replacement rate. The pension amount
is calculated on the basis of the average monthly earnings in the best 15 years
of contribution with an average net replacement ratio of 75% (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005).3
2.2 Invalidity Pension versus Early Retirement due to Re-
duced Working Capacity
In 1993, the Austrian government introduced multiple new provisions for early
retirement. One of these was the \Early Retirement due to Reduced Working
Capacity" (ERRWC). This provision was introduced for older workers with re-
duced working capacity as another form of retirement (along with the invalidity
pension). The main dierence between the two schemes is a higher replacement
2I concentrate on men because the reforms were not eective for women.
3A detailed description of the calculation of pension benets in the Austrian pension system
can be found in Manoli et al. (2009).
4rate for the workers retiring under the ERRWC (details later). The introduction
was announced months before, and hence, individuals could have adapted easily
by postponing their retirement decision. Thus, the introduction of the ERRWC
does not qualify for a natural experiment.
In May 2000, the European Court of Justice ruled that the ERRWC violated
European Law, because the dierence in the retirement age for men and women
discriminated against men. The decision blindsided the government and the
public in Austria. The ERRWC was abolished immediately. Before the abolition,
retirees received a higher pension. After the abolition employees with reduced
working capacity could only apply for the IP. Using this natural experiment, I
can study the eect of income on health.
Under all regimes and for both types, the ERRWC and the IP, an individual, who
wanted to retire, had to be declared as being disabled using the same medical
checkup at the Austrian pension insurance agency. The same physicians evaluated
these pension applicants in the same rooms, using exactly the same procedures
and medical tests. The applicants were randomly assigned to the physicians.4
While both types focused on reduced working capacity, the ERRWC additionally
required a larger job history for eligibility (working six years in the last 15 years).
For the empirical comparisons between ERRWC and IP below, I only consider
the individuals fullling this criterion of eligibility.
The exact dierences in the replacement rates (i.e., in the resulting pension ben-
ets) of the two regimes can be seen in Figure 1a. The graph shows the exact
replacement rate for a male employee aged 57 to 59 with a varying number of
contribution years on the x-axis. If this employee contributed for up to 36 years
to the public pension insurance, he would have received the same pension benets
4This has also been conrmed by the Austrian public pension insurance agency.
5in both regimes. Any further increase in the number of contribution years widens
the gap in the replacement rate.
Immediately after the abolition of the ERRWC, the government discussed the
situation of pension applicants with reduced working capacity and consequently,
removed the replacement rate cap of 60% on the IP and slightly revised the
calculation of the replacement rate. The resulting replacement rate dierences
between the two IP regimes can be found in Figure 1b. As compared to the
previous case, both regimes are identical except for the replacement rate; there
is no need to control for the number of years insured in the last 15 years.
Due to the presence of a dierent pension regime before 2000, I only consider the
employees who retired in 2000. Until June 2000, the ERRWC regime with a high
replacement rate was in place (regime 1). The applicants to the ERRWC in May
(at the time of its abolition) started receiving pension benets in June. Following
this, only the IP regime with the replacement rate cap remained until the end
of September 2000 (regime 2). These retirees received reduced pension benets
for at least seven years. From October 2000 onwards, the IP was changed with
respect to its replacement rate cap (regime 3).
6Figure 1: Replacement rate of an employee aged 57 to 59 depending on the number of
contribution years and pension type
(a) Before and after June 2000 (regimes 1 and 2)
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(b) Before and after October 2000 (regimes 2 and 3)
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I use the administrative employment records from the Austrian social security
system covering the years 1972 to 2009 in detail (Zweim uller et al., 2009). The
records include very detailed data on employers, employees, and employment
spells for all private sector employees. Some information on the type of employ-
ment was recorded retrospectively even up to 1955 and before. This data set also
includes the exact date of death that forms the base for my rst objective health
measure: mortality.
In addition, I use the public health insurance records of Upper Austria (a state
in Austria, with about one tenth of the country's population). Again, only the
private sector employees are included. The public health insurance oce collects
all information about the patient-specic health expenditure, most of which is
stored on a quarterly basis. Some of the expenses can be associated with special
drugs or diagnoses.
Figure 2a shows the inow of IP and ERRWC retirees in the years 1999 to 2001.
The IP retirees were only taken into account if they fullled the stronger require-
ment of the ERRWC5, and as such, not all invalidity retirees are included. In
June 2000, there was a signicant reduction in the inow of retirees with reduced
working capacity because of the abolition of the ERRWC.6
5An ERRWC retiree should have worked six years in the last 15 years.
6Figures 2a and 2b show the presence of ERRWC retirees even after June 2000. Some
retirees had to postpone their retirement due to additional payments at the end of their (long)
employment. A minority had sued the pension agency on being eligible to that pension and
were, therefore, recorded later on.
8Figure 2: Inow of (IP and ERRWC) retirees over time and the replacement rate
regime
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pension applicants
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Replacement rate (ERRWC)   Replacement rate (old IP)  
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9Due to the changes in the general inow of retirees, one could presume that the
older retirees could have been dierent. As such, I restrict the sample to those
individuals who were exactly 57 years old in all regimes (Figure 2b). There is no
signicant change either because the regime with lower retirement income lasted
only for four months or because the inow of retirees did not dier between
younger and older retirees.
Table 1 shows all male retirees by month of entry and pension type. I study the
eect of the abolition of the ERRWC in the end of May 2000 by constructing a rst
sample. This sample contains the ERRWC retirees from January to June 2000
(regime 1) and the IP retirees from June to September 2000 (regime 2). These
correspond to the rows labeled\ERRWC"and\IP"in Table 1, respectively.
The removal of the replacement rate cap four months later will be analyzed using
all IP retirees (i.e., with no restriction on the contribution years) from July to
December 2000 (regimes 2 and 3); this corresponds to the row\IP ALL"in Table 1.
Here, the retirees from October onwards (regime 3) receive a higher replacement
rate for the same number of contribution years.
Health can be measured in various ways. Many authors use self-reported health
indicators (Contoyannis et al., 2004; Frijters et al., 2005), while others measure
health on the basis of objective variables such as BMI, weight (Cawley et al.,
2010) { and mortality (see especially Cutler et al., 2006). In this paper, I use the
7-year mortality risk as the main health outcome. In 2000, the 7-year mortality
risk was 8.3% for 57 years old men and 9.9% for 59 years old men (see Statistik
Austria (2011), mortality table 2000). In the samples, the mean mortality was
7.5% for the ERRWC retirees and 8% for the IP retirees, which is slightly lower























































































































































































































































































































































































































11Measuring health by mortality is a rather conservative approach because mortal-
ity will react only if health is strongly aected by the treatment. Therefore, I
construct a second set of health measures through which the treatment may aect
health. Using the data of the public health insurance records of Upper Austria,
I calculate variables such as the number of visits to a general practitioner or
specialist, health expenditure on prescribed medical drugs or medical aids, and
the number of days in a hospital. These variables may be more sensitive to the
treatments but may also bear more variation due to other factors that might be
correlated with the treatment.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Abolition of the ERRWC
The pension regulations themselves match only the people with the minimum
level of reduced working capacity in all three regimes. Nevertheless, this proce-
dure establishes only some degree of randomization. After May 2000, the rst
reform, the individuals are still able to self-select into treatment by choosing not
to retire at all.
Table 8 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the two groups before
and after the rst reform (column \First Sample"). The dierences in the recent
and 15-year employment history are not signicant but seem to be relevant. The
IP pensioners are slightly less healthy, more often unemployed, and therefore, less
often at work. Looking at the individual characteristics, education is dierent for
the two groups, and so is citizenship to a small extent.
12Due to the dierences in the replacement schemes on the one hand and the
dierences before and after the rst reform (see also Figure 2a) on the other
hand, I need to use matching strategies to overcome the possible selection eects.
Other methods like regression discontinuity and dierence-in-dierence (DiD) are
not applicable for this rst reform because there also exist dierences in several
variables other than the treatment at the threshold, and because of the sample
selection itself.
Figure 3: Distribution of propensity score among treated and untreated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated: On support Treated: Off support
The propensity score matching (PSM) model considers detailed individual em-
ployment and employment history characteristics as well as some measures of
health and wealth.7 All these variables are predetermined at the time of retire-
7 I match on the income before retirement, sum of contribution base over the whole employ-
ment history, employment status right before retirement (unemployed, sick leave, or working),
type of last employment before retirement (blue collar or white collar), classication of the
economic activity of the last employer, location of the last workplace inside Austria, education
(three categories), last income from employment, total net income (not top-coded) for the last
ve years (i.e., a measure for possible wealth accumulated), age at time of retirement (three age
categories), and citizenship (Austrian, unknown, or foreign). For the last year before retirement
13ment. Using a logit estimation for the propensity score, the balancing property is
fullled, with the region of common support being in the interval [0:007;0:968] and
substantially large (see also Figure 3). Only 0.6 percent of the treated and about
3 percent of the controls are o support. Finally, I use various matching meth-
ods (nearest neighbor, local linear regression matching, stratication matching,
kernel matching, and a control function approach) to evaluate the causal eect
of the reform on the 7-year mortality rate of the sampled retirees.
4.2 Removal of the Replacement Rate Cap
On October 1, 2000, the second reform, the removal of the replacement rate cap
of 60% for IP, was initiated. This did not change the number of applicants by
as much as the abolition of the ERRWC did. The details can be seen above in
Figure 2a and Table 1. The regimes 2 and 3 do not dier in any aspect other than
the replacement rate cap. This allows the application of a simple DiD approach
to analyze the eect of an increase in income on health.
Figure 1b shows that the individuals with contribution years between 33.5 and
37.5 had a similar replacement rate. In contrast, the change in income is at least
15.8% for the individuals with more than 40 contribution years. Table 2 shows
the resulting sample and group sizes.
Table 2: Final size of the groups in the DiD design (rst control group)
Control Treatment
(33.5 to 37.5 years) (more than 40 years) Total
June to September 2000 (regime 2) 123 1,316 1,439
October to December 2000 (regime 3) 90 1,103 1,193
Total 213 2,419 2,632
and the preceding 14 years, I match on days worked (also nonlinear, with dummies for years),
days unemployed, and days of sick leave. The procedure also includes several interactions of
these variables.
14Using this control group leads to a very small number of observations (123 pre-
treatment and 90 with treatment) for the control group, because only men aged
57 and above are considered, and most of them had already contributed at least 40
years. Therefore, a second DiD is made using a dierent control group consisting
of the normal early retirees aged 60. These individuals are also very similar to
the treatment group aged 57 to 59 but go for the normal early retirement scheme,
which is not aected by these reforms. Table 3 shows the resulting sample and
group sizes.
Table 3: Final size of the groups in the DiD design (second control group)
Control Treatment
normal early retirees IP retirees with more
aged 60 than 40 contribution years Total
June - September 2000 (regime 2) 4,815 1,316 6,131
October - December 2000 (regime 3) 1,406 1,103 2,509
Total 6,221 2,419 8,640
Various exogenous factors are included in the DiD models; such variables are pre-
determined at the time of retirement. I include dummies for 12 dierent classes
of economic activity of the main employer before retirement as these should cover
some dierences in the risk for work accidents, at least to some extent, typical
occupational diseases. Furthermore, I control for the wages and the number
of contribution months, i.e., the number of months insured in a public pension
insurance. This also controls for some preference to go for retirement due to
long employment life and/or possibly high replacement rate. To control for the
dierences in health before retirement, I use the number of sick days in the last
year before retirement and in the preceding 14 years. The days working and
days unemployed, each measured in the last year before retirement and in the
preceding 14 years, control for the dierent risks of unemployment, and therefore,
15a possibly higher chance of early retirement. Finally, the employment status right
before retirement segregated into the categories unemployed, sick, blue collar, and
white collar should also account for the dierent health risks.
Figures 4 and 5 show the share of survivors after 7 years in retirement for the
treatment and the control group before and after treatment. Considering the
second control group before and during the treatment, both shares mostly follow
a parallel path. Looking at the rst control group, I get that the common trend
seems to be violated after the treatment, but this is mostly due to the small
number of observations in the control group, which increases the standard error.
In a standard two-period DiD, the key assumption demands common trends of
the control and the treatment groups before and after the treatment. Figure 5
suggests that this key assumption is fullled for the second control group, and
if we sum up the gures for November and December, also for the rst control
group in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Common trend validation for the 7-year survival rate in the rst DiD model
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16Figure 5: Common trend validation for the 7-year survival rate in the second DiD


















































Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month of retirement
Treated (IP) Control (normal early retirement)
4.3 Health Expenditure
In addition to mortality, I analyze the health expenditure. Due to smaller sample
sizes, I use this data primarily to verify my PSM design for the rst sample and
the DiD design for the second sample. As for the DiD approach, I can only use
the second control group, i.e., the normal early retirees aged 60, because in the
rst control group, only about 20 observations would have been left. Table 4
contains the exact group sizes for this DiD approach.
Table 4: Final size of the groups in the DiD design using public health data
Control Treatment
normal early retirees IP retirees with more than
aged 60 40 contribution years Total
June to September 2000 532 189 721
October to December 2000 163 172 335
Total 695 361 1056
17The data allows me to compare eight quarters before retirement and 24 quarters
thereafter. The health expenditure preceding retirement should not dier between
the treatment and the control groups in order to test the validity of the chosen
models with respect to selection in health. The dierences after retirement can
show the dierences in health not measured by mortality risk.
5 Results
5.1 Mortality and Survival Rates
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the PSM and the DiD procedures. Using
several methods and variations, I do obtain results, but these are numerically
small (as compared to the mean survival rate). Moreover none of the results is
statistically signicant.
These small and insignicant results of even such a huge decrease in income are in
line with the literature on the eects of income on the health of elderly persons in
the US (see Adams et al. (2003), Cawley et al. (2010), and Cutler et al. (2006)).
The average treatment eects on the treated (ATT) of the rst sample do not vary
much when using dierent matching methods (see Table 5). The results are not
sensitive to a restriction of the sample to the observations on the common support.
Moreover, the eects do not change much when using dierent bandwidths and
calipers for the neighborhood or kernel matching.
18Table 5: Results of the eect of (an increase in) income on survival using PSM
Survival probability PSM OLS
(7 years) NN LL ST Kernel Radius control function approach
ERRWC retirees (ATT) -0.14 0.27 0.1 0.06 0.00
(1.79) (1.16) (1.0) (1.20) (1.20)
ERRWC retirees (ATE) 0.47 1.36 0.59 0.57 1.67 1.62
(1.82) (1.63) (1.24) (1.24) (1.46) (1.43)
propensity score incl. incl. incl. incl.
propensity score2 incl. incl. incl.
propensity score interacted
with treatment incl. incl.
other covariates incl.
constant incl. incl. incl. incl.
observations 4,654 4,654 4,654 4,654 4,526 4,525 4,529 4,529 4,529
R-squared 0.0001 0.001 0.002 0.058
NN:Nearest Neighbor, LL:Local Linear, ST:Stratication
The eects and standard errors are reported in percentage points. The standard errors are in parentheses.
The bootstrapped standard errors are used for local linear and stratication matching and robust standard
errors are used for OLS.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Results of the eect of (an increase in) income on survival using DiD
Control Group
IP Retirees with 33.5 to 37.5 normal early retirees aged 60
contribution years
Survival probability OLS probita OLS probita
DiD (new IP) 0.41 0.08 0.61 1.00
(6.41) (3.20) (1.13) (0.95)
observations 2,632 2,632 8,640 8,640
(pseudo) R2 0.057 0.070 0.030 0.043
The DiD and standard errors are reported in percentage points. The DiD values are calculated
with the treatment group being the IP retirees with more than 40 contribution years in the
public pension system.
a) The DiD values for the probit models are the marginal eects for the interactions in
nonlinear models.
Additional control variables: monthly dummies, NACE codes (12), sum of assessment bases,
contribution months, sick days (1 year), sick days (15 years), days working (1 year), days
working (15 years), days unemployed (1 year), days unemployed (15 years), and employment
status right before retirement (unemployed, sick, or blue collar).
The average treatment eects (ATE), though, are somewhat sensitive to the
dierent methods used. They are not signicant and generally show eects around
0:5 to 1:7 percentage points.
The results using the DiD method, though again insignicant, are only slightly
higher than the ATT estimates of the PSM method. This result suggests that the
real treatment eect is rather low and may even be not dierent from zero. The
19DiD estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of interactions and quadratics in
sickness information nor to the inclusion of monthly dummies (i.e., a nonlinear
time trend). Neither the point estimate nor the standard errors are aected.
5.2 Health Expenditure
With regard to the health expenditure, my samples cover quite few individuals.
First, I use the data on the health expenditure eight months preceding retirement
to verify the model with respect to the selection into treatment. Second, the eect
of the increase in income on those outcomes is analyzed. I use the expenditure on
drugs, expenditure on and number of medical aids, number of visits to a general
practitioner (GP), number of visits to a specialist, and the number of days spent
in a hospital.
The patients have to pay deductibles on drugs, medical aids, and days spent in
a hospital, while for the rest, all expenses are covered by the insurance. The
deductibles on drugs are rather low as compared to those on medical aids and
days spent in a hospital (per day fee). As for the days spent in a hospital, a
patient can leave a hospital earlier if he or she wants to, and some of the patients
may have done this to save money, which might lead to a negative eect on this
outcome due to the reduction in income.
Figures 6 and 7 show the eects of the decrease in income on the health ex-
penditure outcomes. The graphs show the dierence in the health expenditure
outcomes (using the PSM or the DiD model) on the y-axis and the quarter before
and after retirement on the x-axis. Using the quarterly results, I get that there
are no signicant dierences before treatment, suggesting that the selection into
treatment by health status can be ruled out using this data.
20The graphs suggest some positive (but insignicant) increase in the drugs pre-
scribed and in the number of visits to a specialist on the one hand, and a very
slight decrease (again insignicant) in the number of days spent in a hospital
after retirement.
Finally, Table 7 shows the results of the PSM (using local linear regression match-
ing) and DiD models for the aggregated pre and post retirement outcomes. All
the pre-retirement outcomes are not signicant, which again suggests that the
selection into treatment by health status can be ruled out.
In the DiD model, I nd a signicant increase in the expenditure on medicines/drugs
for the retirees under a lower replacement rate. This may be due to the relatively
lower health due to the lower income. The medication may prevent the ultimate
health outcome, mortality, from having an eect on the treatment.
Moreover, the following eects are worth mentioning: the number of medical
aids and the number of hospital days decreased after retiring under a lower re-
placement rate. Though, these eects are not signicant, they can be considered
reasonable as the patient would have to cover the relatively higher deductibles
for such services. Since the retirees already have to bear their lower pension, they
will try to avoid additional expenses such as deductibles.
21Figure 6: PSM (local linear regression) dierences in the eect of decrease in income
on the health expenditure after the rst regime change (regimes 1 and 2)
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22Figure 7: DiD plots of the eect of decrease in income on the health expenditure after
the second regime change (regimes 2 and 3)
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23Table 7: Results of the eect of (increase in) income on the health expenditure using
the PSM and DiD methods
Sample/Method
First regime change Second regime change - DiD results
PSM results (with the normal early retirees
as the control group)
Variable Mean Eect Mean Eect
Before retirement
amount spent on
medicines prescribed 367.25 145.85 345.18 -1.64
(618.81) (101.12) (629.85) (55.40)
medical aids 79.93 73.34 89.48 37.12
(288.17) (62.64) (324.50) (33.37)
visits to a
GP 35.99 0.577 30.54 -0.413
(39.77) (4.313) (39.80) (1.060)
specialist 5.19 0.164 5.88 -0.847
(9.75) (1.051) (12.87) (1.022)
number of
medical aids 19.80 19.39 16.81 -14.96
(194.34) (26.31) (162.25) (64.99)
days spent in 4.97 1.178 3.64 -0.51
a hospital (9.99) (1.190) (9.24) (2.77)
After retirement
amount spent on
medicines prescribed 1,853.69 677.08 1,731.93 685.22*
(3,149.04) (516.05) (3,800.29) (371.90)
medical aids 324.75 245.16 328.77 198.90
(1,194.79) (213.99) (1,311.36) (168.05)
visits to a
GP 110.97 -0.127 92.27 0.180
(119.27) (14.142) (110.53) (3.588)
specialist 14.98 8.50 15.52 4.369
(37.96) (8.52) (40.80) (4.219)
number of
medical aids 60.40 31.45 69.47 -38.20
(324.96) (37.05) (400.12) (381.62)
days spent in 16.86 -1.18 14.34 -2.77
a hospital (30.81) (2.82) (28.37) (5.47)
observations 1,024 1,056
The eects and standard errors for monetary factors are given in Euros. The standard errors for the
eects on the number of visits are calculated using bootstrapping. The treatment group is the IP
retirees with more than 40 contribution years in the public pension system.
Before retirement includes eight quarters before retirement and After retirement includes 24 quarters
thereafter.
Additional control variables in the DiD method: monthly dummies, NACE codes (12), total sum
of wages, contribution months, sick days (1 year), sick days (15 years), days working (1 year), days
working (15 years), days unemployed (1 year), days unemployed (15 years), and employment status
right before retirement (unemployed, sick, or blue collar).
246 Conclusion
The analysis shows that income has no causal eect on the mortality rates of
old aged persons in Austria. Two dierent natural experiments of closely related
policy reforms are analyzed using a PSM with various matching methods and a
DiD model. The distance between the two cohorts being compared by the chosen
methods is at most eight months. This implies that two close (if not the\same")
cohorts are compared during the same period of time. These cohorts are exposed
to the same risks such as epidemics or pandemics. My results are in line with the
results of the literature on the eects of income on health for old aged individuals
in the US (Adams et al., 2003; Cawley et al., 2010; Cutler et al., 2006).
Usually, the eect of earning more is no free lunch: it comes along with increased
stress and/or increased working hours. This eect is ruled out by focusing only
on pensioners. Using the detailed data from the Austrian social security records,
both evaluations result in a low and insignicant eect on mortality compared
to the large reduction in income. One reason for this result may be the very
generous Austrian public health insurance system.
Focusing on other health-related outcomes, I can only access the data of one
state, which covers fewer individuals. First, I use the data to verify the model
with respect to the selection eects for the dierent types of pensions. The results
for public health expenses and the number of visits to a doctor or a hospital before
the retirement suggest that the identication strategy works and that the selection
eects can be ruled out.
Second, the eect of decrease in income on other health-related outcomes after
retirement is analyzed. Only the expenses on prescribed drugs increased signi-
cantly at a 10 percent level due to the loss in income. For the other health-related
25outcomes, such as the number of visits to a general practitioner, a specialist, and
a hospital, and the expenditure on medical aids, no signicant eects were found.
26Table 8: Descriptives of the ERRWC and IP retirees in the rst and second samples
First Sample Second experiment/sample
regimes 1 and 2 regimes 2 and 3
Varialbes ERRWC IP1 IP2 IP3 ER60
Observations 3,957 697 2,419 213 6221
Employment history
days worked (last year) 230.1 172.9 158.4 130.6 215.9
(170.3) (170.5) (166.7) (151.0) (171.0)
days unemployed (last year) 93.9 135.8 84.5 106.8 81.4
(135.4) (144.1) (131.9) (140.9) (140.8)
sick days (last year) 41.2 47.0 43.0 49.6 9.5
(87.8) (102.6) (102.8) (102.8) (44.0)
days worked (last 15 years) 4,625.6 4,577.2 3,539.7 3,290.4 4,079.9
(765.9) (836.2) (2,052.7) (1,958.4) (1,756.0)
days unemployed (last 15 years) 297.6 305.4 290.2 608.0 248.0
(507.2) (481.0) (656.6) (1,052,6) (659.8)
sick days (last 15 years) 68.9 59.2 76.9 129.7 58.9
(150.9) (136.5) (335.7) (451.8) (402.8)
years insured (last 15 years) 13.1 13.0 13.2 11.3 13.5
(1.9) (1.8) (2.4) (4.1) (2.5)
Income history
contribution years 42.6 42.7 42.6 35.6 44.5
(1.31) (1.39) (1.21) (1.21) (1.47)
sum of contribution bases 429,909 454,636 363,801 362,972 444,461
(108,725) (114,529) (178,027) (160,601) (155,251)
assessment base 2,059.4 2,174.9 1,857.2 1,793.4 2,172.2
(494.5) (520.3) (695.9) (704.7) (672.2)
Education
more than compulsory 34.2 % 47.9 % 34.35 % 33.33 % 24.3 %
secondary education 2.1 % 5.2 % 1.98 % 8.45 % 5.98 %
higher education 0.1 % 0.9 % 0.54 % 5.63 % 3.12 %
Citizenship
unknown 7.0 % 6.3 % 2.8 % 5.7 % 5.6 %
other 16.3 % 16.8% 23.0 % 27.4 % 25.4 %
Treatment
before October 2000 | | 54.4 % 57.7 % 77.4 %
IP1: IP retirees before October 2000 who would have been eligible for ERRWC; IP2: All IP retirees
between June to December 2000 with at least 40 contribution years (treatments 1 and 2); IP3: All
IP retirees between June to December 2000 with 33.5 to 37.5 contribution years (control 1); ER60:
All early retirees aged 60 between June and December 2000 with at least 40 contribution years
(control 2)
 Signicant dierences between ERRWC and IP1, IP2 and IP3, or IP2 and ER60
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